Of course, children tell jokes too.
In children humour is linked to
development, it has developmental and social purposes. Humour
requires a stable understanding of the real world, so a distinction
between reality and fantasy can be made and an idea of pretence with
regards to intention or action. The stable understanding required
reflects the development of cognitive and social schemas formed
through infancy and childhood. A schema can be regarded as a dynamic
mental representation that can be used to develop models of reality,
reflecting previous experience with objects, scenes and events that
involve expectations of appearance, the sequence of events (Martin
2007 : 86) and outcome.
Humour is associated with incongruity
between an expected variable and a perceived outcome within a single
schema. There is currently a comprehension-elaboration theory of
humour elicitation, proposed by Robert Wyer & James Collins
(1992) that humour involves the simultaneous activation of two
different schemas to understand a situation or event and the more
elaboration between the two schemas, in that the two different
schemas play back and forth with each other, the more it is perceived
as humorous/ funny (Martin 2007 : 87). The elicitation of humour
involves smiling, laughter and an emotion of mirth that is
accompanied by a loss of muscle tone. This loss of muscle tone is
potentially a disabling mechanism associated with the emotion of
mirth, its function may be to prevent harmful behaviour (Martin 2007
: 164), this suggests that laughter may have evolved from play
behaviour in mammals. Smiling in humans is an emotion display, a
genuine smile is called a “Duchenne display” and involves the
contraction of oricularis oculi muscles around the eyes as well as
zygomatic major contraction and is associated with a reward state
(Wild et al 2003 : 2122). Smiling and laughter are different displays
and have different functions, smiling has origins that are more to
do with a display of absence of hostile intent, while laughter is
more to do with awareness of an incongruence. In humans the two
displays have moved together to represent degrees of intensity of the
emotion of mirth but different cognition between the displays remain.
Smiling is present in infants during
the first month, as a response to tactile and auditory stimulation
associated with a caregiver and, overtime as mental representations
develop, with easy recognition of people. Laughter as a response is
present around 10 to 20 weeks of age and occurs in the context of
infant-caregiver interaction, it occurs with some frequency within
infant-caregiver play sessions (Martin 2007 : 230) and becomes more
strongly associated with visual and social interactions that
accompany play behaviours that induce cognitive demand on the infant
(Martin 2007 : 231). The strongest associations for laughter are
events that are unexpected or incongruous with a child’s developing
cognitive schemas (Martin 2007 : 231). The classic “peek-a-boo”
game seems to induce laughter around 6 to 12 months and the cognitive
load it induces is associated with the mastering of the issue of
“object permanence”, the game has an important social component,
as laughter is only in response to a person playing the game, not an
object.
Humour in children is most strongly
related to play, which is best described by Michael Apter (1982) as
being “a state of mind associated with an activity that is treated
in a non-serious way, it is an activity orientated (rather than
goal-oriented) mental state” (Martin 2007 : 234). There is a
necessary distinction between a lie and a joke and this tends to
occur around 4 years of age.
The distinction between a lie and a
joke is that a joke involves an incongruity placed within a playful
framework, communicated by subtle cues of intent (Semrund-Clikeman &
Glass 2010 : 1250). There appears to be two major neurological
components to humour, cognitive and affective. The cognitive
component involves the left inferior prefrontal cortex and insula,
important for processing speech sounds and the right temporal lobe
for processing and integrating more subtle aspects of language. The
affective component involves the right hemisphere, with focuses in
the medial ventral prefrontal cortex and bilateral cerebellum
(Semrund-Clikeman & Glass 2010 : 1258). Mirth associated laughter
has been induced by stimulation of the fusiform gyrus and
para-hippocampal gyrus , with the description of an altered
perception of “the significance of things” (Wild et al 2003 :
2128).
Approximate functional areas of an adult brain. From Parsons et al 2010 : 232 |
Humour has a socialized component, in
that the cues for “humour” are facial expressions, behavioural
and vocal exaggerations and verbal labels (Martin 2007 : 235), the
schema of play is useful for assimilation (fitted into pre-existing
schema) of incongruous experience because it involves a fantasy
assimilation where the wrong schema can be applied to objects and
events and thus the incongruity is not assimilated to reality. This
type of symbolic play tends to occur around 18 months of age and is
described by a developmental model proposed by Paul McGhee in 1979,
it is similar to, and can be elaborated with Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive Development.
To have the capacity for humour
children need to be able to engage in fantasy play associated with
the preoperational stage of cognitive development. This first stage
McGhee (1979) describes as “incongruous actions towards
objects”, children from 18 months are capable of representing
objects with internal mental schemas that are wrong and are possibly
learned through cognitive errors that adults find humorous, which are
then intentionally repeated with humorous intent (Martin 2007 :
239).
The second stage of McGhee’s humour
development (1979) involves the playful use of language, termed
“incongruous labelling of objects and events”. It occurs
early in the third year of life and reflects the mastery of using
words correctly, such as calling a cat a dog etc. A more advanced
third stage reflects an understanding of the classes of objects that
words refer to and the characteristics of the classes, this occurs
later in the third year of life and is termed “conceptual
incongruity” (McGhee 1979). The idea of differences between
McGhee’s second stage and third state is challenged on the basis
that infants pre-linguistic categories are based on the same
categories of adults and thus the difference in the stages may simply
reflect an improved vocabulary (Martin 2007 : 240). With regards to
child neuroanatomy, by 3 years of age the main fiber tracts and brain
structures appear to be the same as an adult (Parsons et al 2010 : 225).
McGhee’s final stage of humour
development (1979) is termed “multiple meanings” and
occurs around seven years of age and is described as reflecting a
concrete operations stage in Piaget’s theory of cognitive
development. Concrete operational cognition is characterised as the
ability to predict the effects of actions on objects and situations,
the ability to understand the principles of conservation and to
understand that other people have potentially different perspectives.
Humour associated with this stage of development is more
sophisticated and reflects an understanding of the ambiguity of
language in sound (phonology), components of meaning (morphology),
meaning (semantics) and the rules for sentence construction (syntax)
and are able to make and enjoy jokes that have multiple meanings,
logical inconsistencies and inferential thinking.
The example McGhee (1979) gives of this
is the following riddle,
“Why did the old man tiptoe past
the medicine cabinet?
Because he didn’t want to wake up
the sleeping pills.”
An adult version of
this, relying on the same semantic ambiguity would be,
“The archeologist's career ended in
ruins” (Kana 2012 : 77 from
article title)
Although from adolescence to adulthood
there is an increased abstraction, flexibility and critical ability
in cognition, it is argued that the principles of humour achieved at
the multiple meaning stage of McGhee’s humour development
(1979) is representative of the beginnings of the scope present in adult
life.
McGhee in 2002 proposed further
classifications of the development of humour in children (Guo et al
2011), the classifications used in this developmental model are
similar to the 1979 model but acknowledge the reality of approximate
ages, is more empirically based and reflects the contributions of
others.
Stage 1 Laughter at the attachment
figure (6 to 12 or 15 months)
This describes laughter at abnormal
behaviour of adults, that is accompanied by cues for playful intent.
It includes abnormal face expressions, abnormal walking, voices and
game playing. This may potentially reflect the emergence of components of theory of
mind (Parsons et al 2010 : 234) and the use of a "permanence" schema
Stage 2 Treating an object as a
different object ( 12 or 15 months to 3,4 or 5 years)
Similar to the 1979 model but
potentially occurring six months earlier. The beginnings of symbolic
play, treating one type of object as another type of object.
Stage 3 Misnaming objects or actions (2 to 3 or 4 years).
Using developing language skills to deliberately misname objects or actions for the purpose of humour, challenging the use of a single schema.
Stage 4 Playing with word sounds
(not meaning), nonsense real world combinations, and distortion of
feature of objects (3 to 5 years). Strongly associated with the use of language and play is derived from the sounds of language but may also feature challenges to schema, that appear as nonsense real world combinations.
Stage 5 Pre-riddle, transition
period (5 to 6 or 7 years).
Children are interested in the verbal humour of older children but may not understand the ambiguous meaning, the presence and elaboration of multiple schemas.
Stage 6: Riddles or jokes (from
6 or 7 years). With the understanding of double meanings, semantic
ambivalence they are capable of enjoying the incongruence and are
functioning within the scope of adult cognition. Using the Wyer & Collins
(1992) comprehension-elaboration theory of
humour elicitation, they are using and elaborating multiple schemas.
There are critiques of the
developmental stage model proposed by McGhee (1979) (2002). They are
elaborations of Piaget's stage model of Cognitive Development, that
are also linked to ideas of a stage development of morality, such as
correlating the degree of mirth (humour) as a reaction to intentional
and unintentional harmful outcomes with moral development (McGhee
1974), which is an interesting idea. There is a recognition that
humour as used and understood, by children over two years old (Hoicka
& Akhtar 2012 : 599) is a reflection of cognitive development,
which includes the development of a theory of mind and the use of
social schemas. It has been argued that teasing behaviour in
infants from 8 months old, including the offering and withdrawing of
an item and engaging in provocation disruption of other peoples
activities may reflect a theory of mind, an understanding of the
existence of other minds with different intentions (Mireault et al
2012 : 339). This could be a reflection of critical components of
mind emerging (Parsons et al 2010 : 234). A theory of mind is
implicitly demonstrated around 18 months of age, as demonstrated by an awareness of the emotional states of others (intersubjectivity) and
is potentially associated with developments of the inferior parietal
lobule, inferior frontal gyrus and premotor cortex, involved in the detection of agency
of action (Parsons et al 2010 : 234). Explicit demonstration of theory of mind tends
to emerge between four and six years of age (Parsons et al 2010 :
234) and is demonstrated by explicit evidence of attribution of a mind to others, such as children understanding that people can use "their minds" to control their emotions through use of strategies such as distraction and cognitive reframing (Bosacki 2013 : 665).
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